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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	essay	seeks	to	understand	the	domain	and	demands	of	reparative	justice	in	terms	of
moral	vulnerability.	Significant	harms	raise	the	question	of	whether	victims	stand	in	truly
reciprocal	practices	of	accountability;	if	they	do,	they	enjoy	the	power	of	calling	others	to
account	as	well	as	bearing	the	liability	of	being	accountable	to	others.	In	the	aftermath	of
harms,	victims’	moral	vulnerability	is	tested:	they	may	be	exposed	to	the	insult	and	injury
of	discovering	that	they	do	not	enjoy	the	moral	standing	of	holding	others	accountable.
While	the	occasion	of	reparative	justice	is	significant	wrongs	and	wrongful	harms	and
losses,	this	essay	argues	that	the	aim	of	reparative	practices	is	not	only	or	even	primarily
to	redress	those	harms	and	losses,	but	to	address	the	moral	vulnerability	of	victims	by
affirming	their	status	in	accountability	relations.
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There	is	little	philosophical	agreement	on	the	nature	and	aims	of	reparative
justice.	I	seek	to	understand	the	domain	and	demands	of	reparative	justice	in
terms	of	moral	vulnerability.	Significant	harms	raise	the	question	of	whether
victims	stand	in	truly	reciprocal	practices	of	accountability;	if	they	do,	they	enjoy
the	power	of	calling	others	to	account	as	well	as	bear	the	liability	of	being
accountable	to	others.	In	the	aftermath	of	harms,	victims’	moral	vulnerability	is
tested:	they	are	exposed	to	the	insult	and	injury	of	discovering	that	they	do	not
enjoy	the	moral	standing	of	holding	others	accountable.	While	the	occasion	of
reparative	justice	is	significant	wrongs	and	wrongful	harms	and	losses,	the	aim	of
reparative	practices,	I	argue,	is	not	only	or	even	primarily	to	redress	those	harms
and	losses	but	to	address	the	moral	vulnerability	of	victims	by	affirming	their
status	in	accountability	relations.	I	draw	some	consequences	from	this	view	about
the	obligations	of	communities	and	the	communicative	functions	of	reparations	as
understood	in	recent	political	practice.	This	view	also	begins	to	explain	how
varieties	of	reparative	effort	reflect	variations	in	kind	and	degree	of	moral
vulnerability.
The	idea	of	“making	good”	for	a	wrongful	loss	or	injury	by	tendering	to	the	victim
something	of	value,	usually	in	a	ritualized	manner	or	in	a	symbolically	scripted	context,	is
ancient	and	seemingly	spans	all	cultures.1	There	is	yet	little	agreement,	however,	on	the
nature	and	aims	of	reparative	justice.2
(p.111)	 There	is	a	strong	association,	and	many	consider	it	central	or	obvious,	between
reparative	justice	and	restitution	or	compensation	through	transfers	of	money	or	other
materially	valuable	goods.	One	paradigmatic	practice	is	tort	law	and	the	central	principle	is
that	of	compensating	persons	injured	by	wrongful	conduct	to	restore	the	antecedent
status	of	the	wronged	party	or	to	provide	equivalent	or	replacement	value	for	damage	to
her	interests	or	well-being.3	The	other	historical	referent	attached	directly	to	the	term
reparations	is	the	postwar	punitive	practice,	between	nations,	of	losers	being	compelled
to	pay	winners	for	the	losses	suffered	in	conflict—as	in	the	familiar	case	of	reparations
exacted	from	Germany	by	victorious	nations	after	the	First	World	War.	In	the	later
twentieth	century,	however,	a	new	practice	of	reparations	has	since	been	initiated	by
nations,	elaborated	in	the	jurisprudence	of	international	courts	and	embedded	in	United
Nations	guidelines	for	combating	impunity	and	making	remedies	and	reparations	available
to	victims	of	grave	human	rights	abuses.4	This	new	practice	identifies	individuals	(and	in
some	instances	where	individuals	are	targeted	collectively,	groups)	as	the	bearers	of
rights	to	remedies	and	reparations	from	states	for	grave	abuses	of	their	human	rights.
As	a	result,	the	very	concept	of	reparations	has	shifted	rapidly	and	dramatically	from	a
transaction	between	states	to	an	obligation	of	states	(and	possibly	by	implication	other
entities)	to	redress	individuals	or	in	some	instances	groups	by	means	of	diverse	forms	of
reparations	that	may	include	restitution	or	compensation	but	go	beyond	them.
Complexities	of	this	new	practice	of	reparations	call	for	rethinking	some	familiar	ideas	of
reparative	justice	as	restoring	the	status	quo	ante	or	compensating	in	proportion	to
harm.	I	will	argue	that	what	is	revealed	in	reparations	movements	and	struggles	is	a
dimension	of	reparative	justice	that	goes	beneath	the	harms	in	question	to	still	deeper
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issues	of	moral	relationship	and	a	distinct	kind	of	vulnerability	to	indignity	that	inheres	in
it.
I	claim	that	what	is	at	stake	most	fundamentally	in	circumstances	where	reparations	are	at
issue—cases	of	mass	violence,	systemic	abuse,	or	historical	injustice—is	whether	those
wronged	possess	the	standing	to	call	to	account	those	who	have	wronged	them	or	who
bear	responsibility	for	the	repair	of	the	wrongs	they	have	suffered.	To	better
understand	this	dimension	of	reparative	(p.112)	 justice,	I	introduce	the	concept	of
moral	vulnerability.	By	moral	vulnerability,	I	mean	a	vulnerability	that	inheres	in	our
assumption	that	we	possess	a	certain	moral	status	as	full	participants	in	reciprocal
accountability	relations.	All	of	us	who	see	ourselves	as	possessing	this	status	anticipate
that	we	are	rightly	able	to	call	others	to	account	even	as	we	ourselves	are	rightly	liable	to
be	called	to	account	by	others.	The	vulnerability	in	question	is	the	potential	for	being
exposed	to	the	insult	and	additional	injury,	when	we	perceive	ourselves	wronged,	of
having	our	standing	to	call	others	to	account	denied,	dismissed,	or	ignored	in	ways	that
call	our	very	status	as	full	participants	into	question.	Practices	of	accountability	that
position	individuals—and	in	social	and	political	life,	groups—in	presumed	reciprocal
relations	of	accountability	are	the	scene	of	our	moral	vulnerability.	To	be	vulnerable,	in	its
primary	(and	root)	meaning,	is	to	be	“capable	of	being	wounded.”	In	cases	of	moral
vulnerability,	the	wound	to	which	we	are	vulnerable	is	dismissal	or	degradation	of	our
status	as	full	participants	in	reciprocal	accountability.	Significant	wrongs	and	wrongful
harms	and	losses	test	our	vulnerability	to	being	wounded	in	that	way	by	supplying	the
occasion	for	our	attempts	to	hold	others	accountable.
All	of	us	are	vulnerable	to	this	form	of	disregard—not	only	to	being	wronged	but	also	to
finding	our	demands	for	morally	appropriate	responses	by	others	to	be	without	effect.
On	my	view,	the	concern	and	aim	of	reparative	practices	is	not	only	to	supply	measures
to	assuage	or	compensate	for	wrongful	harm	and	loss	but	also,	and	in	some	cases
primarily,	to	address	the	moral	vulnerabilities	of	victims	by	ensuring	that	they	do	not
suffer	the	indignity	of	dismissal.	In	cases	in	which	reparations	are	at	issue,	victims	of
grave	and	usually	massive	wrongs	have	typically	suffered	persistent	denial	and	exclusion
from	relations	of	reciprocal	accountability,	both	in	the	event	of	wrongdoing	and	often	in	its
genesis	and	aftermath.	In	these	cases,	grave	wrongs	supply	the	occasion	of	reparative
justice	and	restitution	or	material	compensation	on	some	such	occasions	may	be
necessary	or	uniquely	effective	as	one	part	of	reparations.	I	argue,	however,	that	the
concern	and	aim	of	reparative	practices	is	always	also	to	recognize	and	address	the	past
and	continuing	moral	vulnerabilities	of	victims	of	serious	wrongs.	It	is	only	by	addressing
the	dignitary	wounds	and	future	threats	of	failures	of	reciprocal	accountability	that	such
wrongs	are	truly	redressed.	It	is	only	by	understanding	this	dimension	of	reparative
justice	that	the	different	demands	of	different	contexts	of	reparation	are	explained.
In	Section	1,	I	give	varied	examples	of	the	new	practice	of	reparations	to	bring	out	the
complexity	of	reparations	struggles	and	demands	and	to	sharpen	the	question	of	what
this	practice	reveals	about	the	guiding	concern	of	reparative	justice.	In	Section	2,	I
explain	how	moral	vulnerability	inheres	in	accountability	relations	both	in	everyday	life
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and	in	the	kinds	of	cases	at	which	reparations	aim	and	argue	that	attention	to	moral
vulnerability	exposes	a	deeper	unifying	concern	of	reparative	justice.	In	Section	3,	I	show
the	role	that	moral	vulnerability	plays	in	shaping	reparations	demands	and	attempts,	as
different	kinds	(p.113)	 and	histories	of	accountability	failures	leave	different	wounds
and	threats	to	be	reckoned	with	as	a	matter	of	justice.	In	Section	4,	I	conclude	with	some
observations	on	the	ways	that	monetary	compensation—a	measure	so	associated	with
reparations	that	it	can	eclipse	the	larger	aims	and	logic	of	reparative	justice—plays	its
role.
1.	A	New	Practice	of	Reparations
The	basic	principle	of	reparations,	affirmed	by	the	UN	General	Assembly	in	2006	after	a
decade	of	study,	is	that	victims	of	gross	violations	of	international	human	rights	law	or
serious	violations	of	international	humanitarian	law	should	be	provided	with	“full	and
effective	reparation.”	Recognized	modes	of	reparations	include	the	following:	restitution;
material	compensation;	rehabilitation	through	legal,	medical,	and	social	services;
guarantees	of	nonrepetition	through	institutional	reform;	and	“satisfaction”	(a	category	of
diverse	measures	that	include	truth-telling,	exhuming	human	remains	from	atrocities,
public	apology,	commemoration,	and	educational	activities)	(United	Nations,	2006).5	This
emergent	political	practice	of	reparations	has	been	driven	sometimes	by	legal	actions	and
decisions,	sometimes	by	political	movements,	and	sometimes	by	the	interaction	of	both	as
well	as	by	contemporary	movements	for	the	recognition	of	historical	injustices	to
groups.6	In	cases	of	systemic	or	mass	violence	and	historical	injustice,	the	legal	model	of
proportionate	compensation	for	individual	injury	can	seem	inapt	or	inadequate	on	both
theoretical	and	practical	grounds.7	In	response,	a	recent	generation	of	theoretical	work
on	reparations	and	reparative	justice	includes	expressly	moral	and	political	conceptions	in
which	compensation	is	an	instrument	or	part,	never	in	itself	sufficient	and	not	always
necessary,	of	a	larger	set	of	measures	meant	to	recognize	victims	of	violence	and
injustice,	reaffirm	their	moral	dignity,	and	create	or	reinstate	their	status	as	citizens
equal	to	others	or	recognition	of	their	status	as	a	people	or	nation	(see	de	Greiff	2006;
Thompson	2002;	Verdeja	2007;	von	Platz	&	Reidy	2006).
(p.114)	 Examples	of	the	contemporary	practice	of	reparations	demands	and	reparations
programs	are	diverse.	For	many,	the	case	of	unjustly	interned	Japanese-American
citizens	during	World	War	II	is	illustrative	of	a	meaningful	and	effective	reparations	effort.
During	the	war,	Japanese-American	citizens	had	been	indiscriminately	and	forcibly
removed	from	their	homes	as	a	security	risk	and	interned	at	bleak	and	distant	camps,
suffering	captivity,	humiliation,	and	loss	of	property.	They	eventually	achieved	recognition
and	reparation	on	behalf	of	the	nation	when	the	United	States	Congress	conducted
extensive	hearings	with	hundreds	of	witnesses	to	produce	its	official	report,	Personal
Justice	Denied,	finding	that	violation	of	Japanese-American	citizens’	rights	occurred	due
to	racism,	war	hysteria,	and	failed	leadership.	With	the	Civil	Liberties	Act	of	1988,
individual	survivors	received	not	only	acknowledgment	through	the	report	but	also	a
symbolic	monetary	payment	of	$20,	000	(close	to	the	amount	suggested	by	advocacy
organizations),	an	individual	letter	of	official	apology	from	the	president	of	the	United
States,	and	pardon	for	convictions	related	to	violating	the	internment	and	restoration	of
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status	and	entitlements.	Funds	were	also	appropriated	for	research	and	public
educational	activities	related	to	the	internment.	Interned	Japanese-American	citizens	saw
their	internment	publicly	examined	and	repudiated,	their	rights	as	citizens	and	subjects
of	justice	reaffirmed,	and	their	humiliation	and	suffering	acknowledged	through	a	variety
of	symbolic	measures.8
In	another	and	very	different	kind	of	case,	the	long-running	pursuit	by	the	Lakota	Sioux
people	of	return	of	the	Black	Hills	by	the	United	States	has	not	been	settled	or	repaired,
despite	a	1980	United	States	Supreme	Court	ruling	in	United	States	v.	Sioux	Nation	that
the	1877	statute	that	appropriated	the	Black	Hills	from	the	Lakota	was	an	unconstitutional
taking	of	treaty-guaranteed	lands,	legally	obligating	the	United	States	to	pay	just
compensation	to	contemporary	Lakota	people.	The	Sioux,	however,	refuse	to	this	day	to
accept	the	monetary	award	that	was	placed	in	trust,	today	standing	at	over	USD$500
million,	despite	crushing	rates	of	poverty,	unemployment,	incarceration,	and	ill	health
among	the	Lakota	and	periodic	efforts	to	effect	a	monetary	settlement.	The	Lakota	Sioux
insist	on	return	of	the	Black	Hills,	which	are	central	to	their	political	and	cultural	identity.
Indian	legal	theorist	Rebecca	Tsosie	explains	that	the	tort	model	of	compensating	citizens
for	past	wrongs	does	not	meet	the	claims	of	Indian	people	to	cultural	and	political	rights
as	separate	governments,	including	rights	to	protect	their	lands.	Further,	the	settlement
of	a	property	claim	fails	to	touch	“the	moral	and	dignitary	harms”	suffered	by	the	Sioux
as	a	people,	such	as	the	genocidal	military	campaign	against	them	and	purposeful	attempts
to	destroy	their	culture,	of	which	the	taking	of	their	lands	is	one	part	(Tsosie	2007,	p.	54;
see	also	Barkan	2003).	Attempt	to	redress	the	Lakota	(p.115)	 Sioux	dispossession	by
means	of	a	monetary	payment	within	the	framework	of	property	rights	remains	inscribed
within	and	reiterates	the	legal	and	cultural	framework	that	not	only	displaced	those	of
Native	nations	through	conquest	but	also	devalued	them	and	legitimated	the	destruction
of	American	Indian	cultures	with	their	own	understandings	of	justice	and	of	their	status
as	nations.
While	the	turn	toward	a	new	practice	of	reparations	is	commonly	dated	to	West
Germany’s	program	of	reparations	to	Jewish	survivors	of	the	Holocaust,	other	well-
known	cases	of	extreme	rights	violations	from	the	same	era	remain	unresolved.	The	long
and	tangled	history	of	silence,	denial,	evasion,	and	compromised	reparations	attempts	in
the	case	of	women	sexually	enslaved	in	military	brothels	run	by	the	Japanese	Army	in
World	War	II	defies	brief	description.	Although	the	enslavement,	daily	multiple	rapes,
forced	abortions,	and	other	gross	abuses	of	the	women	(unfortunately	labeled	comfort
women)	was	known	at	the	conclusion	of	the	war,	the	government	of	Japan	did	not	make	a
clear	admission	of	its	role	until	the	Kono	statement	of	1993.	Its	reparative	attempts
consisted	of	a	trail	of	apologies	from	successive	prime	ministers	of	Japan	and	the	creation
of	the	evasively	named	Asian	Women’s	Fund	in	1995	to	disburse	monies	to	elderly
survivors.	The	fund,	which	terminated	its	operations	in	2007,	paid	compensation	(called
sympathy	money)	to	285	women,	a	fraction	of	existing	survivors.	Many	survivors	have
refused	the	offer	because	much	of	the	money	in	the	Asian	Women’s	Fund	was	raised	by
private	sources	and	none	of	the	Japanese	attempts	at	official	apology	have	been	judged
by	the	women	to	accept	blame	categorically	on	the	part	of	the	Japanese	government.	The
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situation	has	been	worsened	by	continuing	resistance	or	oscillation	in	statements	by	the
Japanese	government	regarding	admission	of	wartime	atrocities,	including	the
enslavement	of	the	women,	and	by	revisionist	tendencies	in	Japanese	textbooks
concerning	sexual	enslavement	(and	other	slave	labor).9
Many	other	cases	might	be	discussed:	precedent-setting	German	postwar	reparations	to
Jewish	survivors	of	the	Holocaust	and	to	the	new	State	of	Israel;	extensive	reparations
programs	to	individual	victims	in	several	Latin	American	countries—Argentina,	Chile,
Brazil—in	the	aftermath	of	repressive	governments	that	practiced	torture,
disappearance,	and	illegal	detention	against	their	own	citizens;	the	continuing	pursuit	by
African	Americans	of	redress	for	slavery	or	for	Jim	Crow	legal	discrimination	and
segregation;	monetary	reparations	to	victims	who	testified	before	South	Africa’s	Truth
and	Reconciliation	Commission;	demands	of	African	countries	for	reparations	from
Europe	for	colonialism;	direct	reparations	from	individual	(p.116)	 perpetrators	to
victims	of	lesser	crimes	or	property	offenses	through	the	innovative	Community
Reconciliation	Procedures	implemented	by	Timor-Leste’s	Commission	for	Reception,
Truth	and	Reconciliation.	While	I	cannot	in	this	paper	do	justice	to	individual	cases	or
elaborate	fully	on	differences	among	types	of	conflicts,	between	episodes	of	repression
and	intergenerational	histories	of	injustice,	and	between	the	reparations	aimed	at
individuals	(even	if	targeted	as	members	of	groups)	and	reparations	aimed	at	groups,	I
offer	these	cases	as	a	point	of	reference	for	my	question	concerning	the	fundamental
issue	at	stake	in	reparative	justice.	Can	any	significant	unity	be	found	in	the	guiding
concern	of	reparative	justice	that	also	helps	to	explain	the	different	demands	reparative
justice	makes	in	different	situations	and	the	reasons	victims	have	to	entertain	or	to
reasonably	reject	reparative	offers	that	involve	both	the	transfer	of	money	or	goods	and
other	gestures	of	reparation?
2.	Accountability	Relations	and	Threats	to	Moral	Standing
It	is	widely	acknowledged	that	reparations	cannot	just	consist	in	the	tendering	of	goods
or	money	to	those	who	have	suffered	grave	wrongs	and	wrongful	harms.	Compensation
can	be	purely	remedial	and	forward-looking,	seeking	to	create	fair	distributions	or
equality	of	opportunity	without	addressing	effects	of	wrongful	treatment	or	injustice.
Compensation	can	also	be	a	charitable	act	impelled	by	compassion	for	loss	and	unjust
suffering	that	comes	from	those	who	accept	no	responsibility	or	bear	no	relationship	to	a
wrong.	The	very	concept	of	reparations,	however,	seems	deeply	connected	with	issues
of	wrongfulness	and	responsibility.	Decades	ago,	Bernard	Boxill	(1972)	made	this	point:
“Part	of	what	is	involved	in	rectifying	an	injustice	is	an	acknowledgment	on	the	part	of	the
transgressor	that	what	he	is	doing	is	required	of	him	because	of	his	prior	error….
Without	the	acknowledgment	of	error,	the	injurer	implies	that	the	injured	has	been
treated	in	a	manner	that	befits	him;	he	cannot	feel	that	the	injured	party	is	his	equal”	(p.
118).10	Boxill’s	insight	draws	attention	to	the	importance	of	what	the	reparative
interaction	reveals	about	the	wrongdoer’s	appreciation	of	the	standing	of	the	injured
party.	As	I	will	argue	shortly,	the	original	wrong	is	the	occasion	for	an	act	of	reparations,
but	what	is	at	stake	in	whether	(adequate)	reparations	are	offered	is	the	recognition	of	a
certain	kind	of	relationship	and	its	implications.	Nor	does	this	recognition	have	to	do	only
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with	the	wronged	party	and	the	wrongdoer.
(p.117)	 To	capture	the	widely	shared	sense	that	reparative	justice	and	reparations
involve	issues	of	wrong,	responsibility,	and	just	redress,	I	characterize	clear	cases	of
reparations	in	this	way:	reparations	consist	in	responsible	parties’	intentionally	giving
appropriate	goods	to	victims	of	wrong	as	a	specific	act	(or	process)	that	expresses
acknowledgment	of	that	wrong,	responsibility	for	that	wrong	or	its	repair,	and	intent	of
rendering	just	treatment	deserved	by	a	victim	in	virtue	of	that	wrongful	treatment.	This
characterization	tells	only	what	kinds	of	acts	or	programs	count	indisputably	as
reparations:	they	must	directly	communicate	recognition	of	the	reality	and	the	nature	of
wrongs,	the	insult	and	harm	suffered	by	the	victim	in	wrongful	treatment,	the	victim’s
deservingness	of	repair	as	a	matter	of	justice,	and	the	responsibility	of	those	offering
reparations	to	take	up	the	demand	of	reparative	justice.11	It	is	true	that	common	usage
is	more	elastic	than	this	definition	allows.	Sometimes	the	achievement	of	a	legal	judgment
or	settlement	is	taken	by	victims,	or	is	claimed	by	responsible	parties,	or	is	reported	in
news	media	as	“reparations”	when	responsibility	is	not	clearly	or	expressly
communicated	or	even	when	it	is	formally	denied.	I	do	not	seek	to	reform	common
usage,	but	I	believe	that	my	explanation	of	reparations	in	terms	of	moral	vulnerability
helps	to	illuminate	why	these	extended	uses	can	make	sense	in	context	or	may	be
strategically	useful	or	symbolically	hopeful,	a	point	I	return	to	briefly	in	conclusion.
If	paradigmatic	acts	of	reparations	embody	acknowledgment,	responsibility,	and	an	intent
to	do	justice,	why	are	these	aspects	of	central	importance?	What	most	fundamentally
does	reparative	justice	concern,	and	to	what	must	it	respond?	I	suggest	the	key	lies	in
that	form	of	relationship	that	is	constitutive	of	any	moral	structure	in	actual	life:	relations
of	accountability	that	connect	individuals	to	others	through	recognition	of	responsibilities
under	certain	shared	norms.	The	norms	that	structure	accountability	relations	are	norms
for	acceptable	conduct.	Among	these	are	norms	for	acceptable	responses	to
unacceptable	conduct—conduct	that	has	failed	to	observe	mutually	recognized	norms.
Wrongs	always	in	principle	pose	a	set	of	questions	and	a	set	of	potential	threats	to	the
structure	of	accountability	and	to	those	who	see	themselves	as	parties	to	it.	I	call	the
threat	that	serious	wrongs	pose	moral	vulnerability,	that	is,	a	particular	kind	of
vulnerability	that	arises	from	our	participation	in	the	practices	of	accountability.	Moral
vulnerability	involves	exposure	to	a	particular	kind	of	wound	that	can	be	inflicted	on	any
of	us	who	stands	in,	or	aspires	to	stand	in,	reciprocal	relations	of	accountability	based	in
mutually	recognized	standards.
To	be	a	participant	in	practices	of	accountability,	to	borrow	some	language	from	P.	F.
Strawson’s	(1968)	classic	essay,	is	to	be	viewed	as	an	apt	target	(pending	excuse	or
exemption)	for	demands	for	accountability	by	others	in	virtue	of	how	we	behave.	But
Strawson	reminded	us	that	not	all	individuals	are	seen	all	(p.118)	 of	the	time	as	eligible
and	competent	participants	and	that	to	be	a	human	actor	who	is	not	so	seen	is	to	be
viewed	with	an	“objective	attitude”	by	others	who	do	so	see	themselves	as	full
participants.	Strawson	did	not	mean	that	within	the	objective	attitude	people	are	seen	as
objects	rather	than	human	beings.	He	meant	that	human	beings	seen	in	that	way	fall
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outside	(wholly	or	in	part)	the	form	of	relationship	experienced	by	those	who	see
themselves	and	each	other	as	eligible	and	competent.	This	relationship	is	one	of
accountability:	it	consists	in	suffering	the	demands	of	others	on	us	to	render	accounts	of
our	conduct	and,	where	our	conduct	is	unexcused,	accepting	responsibility	and	in	turn
enjoying	the	standing	to	make	similar	claims	upon	others.	When	seen	from	the	objective
attitude,	one	is	an	object	to	be	controlled	or	managed,	not	a	participant	in	reciprocal
accounting.	The	standing	to	hold	and	to	be	held	to	account	is	what	makes	one	a
participant,	and	being	able	to	hold	others	and	being	oneself	held	to	account	in	particular
ways	characterizes	one’s	relative	position	as	a	participant.	To	possess	this	standing	is	a
kind	of	recognition	and	empowerment,	even	if	its	consequences	can	be	onerous.
The	situation	I	call	moral	vulnerability	is	the	possibility	that	one	may	fail	to	be	recognized
as	a	participant,	or	as	the	kind	of	participant	one	believes	one	is	entitled	to	be,	in	a
particularly	direct	way,	by	the	refusal	of	one’s	demands	for	accountability.	One	may	also
find	that	the	norms	governing	and	constituting	relations	of	accountability	are	in	some
crucial	respects	not	as	one	believes	that	they	are	or	should	be.12	Subordinates	in	a
workplace	can	discover	that	their	objections	to	being	treated	thoughtlessly	or	rudely	by
superiors	receive	no	apology	or	even	no	reply.	A	sex	worker	can	be	met	with	skepticism
or	ridicule	in	trying	to	press	a	complaint	of	assault	or	theft	by	a	customer	to	authorities.
Victims	of	political	violence	may	discover	that	their	fellow	citizens,	even	their	neighbors,
find	security	in	assuming	that	they	must	have	done	something	that	earned	their
mistreatment.	Not	infrequently,	others	would	rather	not	know.	Ksenija	Bilbija	(2005)
quotes	a	high	school	student	who	disappeared	for	nine	months	during	the	military
dictatorship	in	Argentina:	“‘Don’t	tell	us	anything,’	her	parents	warned	her	when	they
were	all	alone	in	the	house”	(p.	115).	Not	only	wrongdoers	but	also	communities	can	fail
to	demand	accountability	or	to	stand	with	a	victim	of	wrongdoing	who	demands	it.
Reparative	justice,	I	suggest,	aims	to	maintain	accountability	relations	by	tending	to	our
moral	vulnerability.	It	“does	justice”	by	remediating	wrongful	loss	and	suffering	that
should	not	have	to	be	borne	or	absorbed	by	the	victim,	but	even	more	fundamentally	it
responds	to	our	right	and	need	to	have	(p.119)	 purchase	on	others’	due	attention
when	we	suffer	unacceptable	treatment.	Because	wrongful	harm	and	loss	of	material,
physical,	psychological,	and	social	sorts	is	so	obviously	the	occasion	of	reparations,	it	can
obscure	the	presence	and	import	of	specifically	moral	vulnerability	as	the	issue	at	its
core.	Moral	vulnerability	is	the	potential	for	harm	that	inheres	in	the	situation	of	one	who
has	suffered	serious	wrong	in	the	context	of	those	practices	of	accountability	to	which
one	considers	himself	or	herself	a	party.	If	the	whole	concern	of	reparations	were
indemnification	or	making	good	for	loss,	it	is	unclear	why	reparations	demand	the
acknowledgment	of	wrong	and	responsibility	to	repair	it	as	a	matter	of	justice.
Acknowledgment	and	acceptance	of	responsibility	confirm	that	the	one	wronged	is
entitled	to	an	accounting,	and	this	may	be	of	special	importance	for	those	who	have
suffered	persistent	unacknowledged	or	unredressed	wrongs.
Accountability	is	a	relation:	to	be	accountable	is	to	be	accountable	to	someone	in	the
matter	of	one’s	conduct.	The	most	minimal	sense	of	accountability	is	answerability,	to	be
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in	circumstances	where	one	is	obliged	to	inform	others	concerning	one’s	conduct	and
activity.	More	specifically,	one	must	answer	with	explanations	or	justifications	that	are
responsive	to	others’	legitimate	interests	and	expectations	in	regard	to	that	behavior.	To
be	answerable	submits	one	at	the	least	to	judgments	of	the	acceptability	or
unacceptability	of	one’s	conduct.	Another	meaning	of	accountability	is	liability	to	sanction,
that	is,	exposure	to	penalty	or	punishment	for	behavior	that	fails,	without	excuse	or
justification,	to	satisfy	a	requirement	or	normative	expectation,	an	expectation	about	how
others	should	or	must	behave,	based	on	law,	morality,	agreement,	or	common
understandings.	Behavior	that	violates	standards	or	norms	creates	a	warrant	for	inflicting
disapproval	or	reproof	and	enforcing	some	demand	on	the	violator	in	the	forms	of
punishment,	penalty,	or	amends.
Both	forms	of	accountability—answerability	and	liability	to	sanction—adhere	to	authority
relations,	usually	asymmetrically:	employees	are	accountable	to	bosses,	subordinates	to
superiors,	children	to	supervising	adults,	where	the	authority	has	standing	both	to
demand	accounts	and	to	take	remedial	or	punitive	action.	Common	morality,	however,
supposes	that	competent	agents	are	answerable	to	and	may	in	turn	demand	accountings
from	at	least	some	(if	not	all)	others	with	respect	to	some	matters.	The	accountability
constitutive	of	common	morality	reveals	itself	especially	in	the	case	of	behavior	that
appears	to	violate	widely	recognized	moral	norms,	where	people	are	likely	to	be	pressed
to	explain	themselves	or	admit	fault,	whether	or	not	any	sanction	beyond	disapproval	or
reproach	can	be	applied.	In	the	optimal	case,	the	offending	party	is	called	to	answer
(whether	voluntarily	or	under	some	compulsion)	and,	lacking	excuse	or	justification,	to
accept	liability	at	least	to	negative	judgment	and	potentially	to	demands	for	remedial
action	(at	a	minimum,	an	apology),	even	if	the	required	response	cannot	be	commanded
or	compelled.	Offended	parties	and	others	who	share	in	commonly	accepted	standards,
then,	are	in	a	(p.120)	 position	to	demand	accounts	for	apparently	unacceptable	or	faulty
behavior,	and	offending	parties	are	required	to	give	accounts	and	to	recognize	the
legitimacy	of	negative	judgments	and	to	respond	to	their	consequences.
If	this	is	what	accountability	means	in	its	most	elementary	form—answerability	that	opens
at	least	the	possibility	of	negative	assessment	and	its	potentially	demanding	consequences
—there	are	vulnerabilities	on	both	(or	all)	sides	when	wrong	has	been	done.	The
apparent	wrongdoer	is	vulnerable	to	misplaced	demands	for	accounting	or	to
attributions	of	fault	or	responsibility	that	might	be	unreasonable	or	unfair.	In	discussions
of	reparations	for	historical	injustices,	atrocities,	or	systemic	violence,	the	cogency	or
fairness	of	placing	responsibility	on	particular	parties	is	often	discussed:	whether
currently	living	people	can	bear	responsibilities	of	reparation	for	injustices	committed
long	before	they	existed	or	for	their	eventual	effects;	whether	being	under	others’
authority	or	being	influenced	by	intense	situational	pressures	constitute	excusing
circumstances;	or	whether	some	are	unfairly	scapegoated	if	they	are	held	responsible
when	some	others	who	behaved	similarly	are	not.
I	intend	here,	however,	to	examine	the	moral	vulnerability,	the	exposure	to	a	moral
wound,	of	the	seriously	wronged	individual.	The	potential	wound	of	one	wronged	is	to	be
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ignored	or	repudiated	in,	or	erased	or	excluded	from,	one’s	standing	to	demand	an
account	from	another	for	conduct	one	believes	is	a	serious	wrong	or	the	source	of
wrongful	harm	to	oneself.	For	the	apparent	wrongdoer,	freedom	from	accounting	to	the
wronged	party	or	to	others	is	moral	invulnerability,	the	most	profound	form	of	impunity
—not	merely	freedom	from	punishment	or	other	sanction	but	also	exemption	from	the
most	basic	kind	of	accountability,	the	obligation	to	answer	for	one’s	conduct	to	some	(or
all)	others.	For	the	victim,	the	inability	effectively	to	command	accounts	from	others	for
apparent	wrongdoing	raises	a	question—and	sometimes	an	alarm—concerning	the
victim’s	participant	status	in	relations	of	accountability.	In	both	terms	of	the	accountability
relation	in	any	context,	there	are	possibilities	of	dignity	and	degradation	for	those	who	call
for	an	accounting	and	those	who	are	called	to	it.	Since	my	concern	here	is	with	the	moral
vulnerability	of	the	victim	of	serious	wrong,	I	examine	the	structure	of	the	victim’s
situation.
Suppose	X	is	the	apparent	agent	of	wrongful	hurt,	harm,	or	loss.	Then	X	stands	liable	to
accounting,	assessment,	and	pressures	for	sanction	or	reparation.	The	apparent	victim
should	be	able	to	demand	an	account	of	X,	to	confront	X	with	a	negative	assessment,	and
possibly	to	demand	satisfaction	from	X	and	the	support	of	others	in	seeking	satisfaction
(through	informal	or	formal	reproach,	punishment,	or	amends)	from	X.	The	“ability”	to	do
these	things	refers	to	a	standing	within	relations	of	accountability	that	must	be
recognized	by	others,	not	to	a	physical	or	psychological	capability.	So	the	victim’s
specifically	moral	vulnerability	concerns	whether	the	victim	does	enjoy	that	standing.	The
victim	is	morally	vulnerable	to	finding	that	others,	including	(p.121)	 but	not	only	the
perpetrator	of	wrongful	harm,	in	some	way	fail	to	respond	in	ways	that	affirm	that
standing.	Others	might	not	see	what	the	victim	has	suffered	as	wrong	because	they
blame	the	victim	or	do	not	believe	him.	They	might	not	recognize	that	the	victim	is	entitled
to	call	the	offender	to	account,	perhaps	because	the	victim	is	negligible	or	despised	or
the	offender	is	powerful	or	esteemed.	Others	might	not	recognize	the	victim	as
protected	by	the	norms	that	support	the	victim’s	negative	assessment	of	the	offender,	as
if	standards	of	common	courtesy,	decency,	or	justice	apply	only	among	people	in	some
social	places	and	the	victim	is	not	among	them.	They	might	not	recognize	or	support	the
victim’s	demands	on	the	offender	or	others	for	satisfaction	or	redress	as	legitimate	or
compelling;	they	might	think	that	this	is,	after	all,	the	lot	of	a	woman,	a	servant,	or	a
person	of	lower	caste.	The	wronged	party	who	believes	that	he	or	she	enjoys	reciprocal
accountability	relations	with	the	presumed	wrongdoer,	or	at	least	enjoys	this	standing	in
the	domain	of	interactions	at	issue,	is	exposed	to	the	moral	wound	of	being	disqualified,
degraded,	or	excluded	from	fully	reciprocal	accountability	relations,	at	least	in	the
instance	at	issue.	A	statement	rejecting	“overly	critical”	history	textbooks,	attributed	to
the	Japanese	Ministry	of	Education	in	the	1950s,	for	example,	reveals	an	entirely	common
attitude	by	no	means	specific	to	Japan:	“The	violation	of	women	is	something	that	has
happened	on	every	battlefield	in	every	era	of	human	history.	This	is	not	an	issue	that
needs	to	be	taken	up	with	respect	to	the	Japanese	Army	in	particular”	(Lind	2008,	pp.	35–
36).13	Indeed,	accountability	for	sexual	violations	of	women	in	conflict	was	not	firmly
established	in	international	law	until	the	past	two	decades;	the	disputed	reparation	for
comfort	women	described	earlier	emerged	in	this	recent	climate.
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Of	course,	a	self-described	victim	may	be	simply	mistaken	or	out	of	bounds	in	claiming
wrongs,	assigning	responsibility,	or	putting	demands.	Yet	accountability	practices	are
dynamic;	they	are	a	medium	in	which	obligations,	values,	and	accountability	relations	are
affirmed	or	denied,	contested	or	negotiated.	For	this	reason	the	patterns	embodied	in
practices	of	accountability	are	important	for	asserting	or	testing	one’s	participant	status.
One	way	to	assert	an	existing	or	proposed	boundary	within	relations	of	accountability	is
to	refuse	to	account	for	behavior	to	persons	who	are	not,	in	one’s	view	or	by	the
standards	one	believes	prevail,	entitled	to	demand	accounts.	You	may	not	have	any
standing	to	monitor	my	financial	or	familial	or	sexual	affairs,	and	if	you	presume	upon	me
for	accounts	I	will	justifiably	refuse	to	give	them.	It	is	also	true	that	our	social	and	moral
worlds	are	segmented	by	specialized	accountability	relations:	the	truth	owed	a	friend	is
not	necessarily	owed	a	stranger,	and	my	employer	may	impose	a	pay	reduction	in	penalty
for	my	unauthorized	early	departures	when	my	irritated	coworkers	may	not.
(p.122)	 In	speaking	of	reparations,	however,	we	are	typically	speaking	of	very	grave
wrongs	and	harms	to	human	beings.	We	are	speaking	of	wrongs	such	as	assaults	to
physical,	psychological,	and	social	well-being;	denial	of	rights;	subjection	to	inhumane	or
humiliating	treatment	or	deprivation;	or	significant	destruction	or	alienation	of	property,
livelihood,	or	heritage.	With	respect	to	these	profound	insults	to	well-being	and	dignity,
human	beings	will	usually	feel	themselves	grossly	ill-treated,	even	if	their	social	or	legal
positions	institutionalize	their	diminishment	in,	or	exclusion	from,	fully	reciprocal
accountability.	If	they	cry	out	against	injustice	anyway,	and	in	the	case	of	oppressed
groups	some	invariably	do,	they	bid	for	some	or	for	greater	recognition	that	something	is
owed	to	them	for	a	real	wrong	and	the	harms	it	inflicts.	In	doing	so,	they	assert	a
participant	role	in	accountability	relations	that	is	uncertain	or	that	has	been	denied	to
them.
Those	who	experience	what	they	take	to	be	gross	injustice	yearn	for,	and	where	possible
seek,	some	validation	from	others	that	their	sense	of	their	experience	is	true.	Most
simply,	moral	validation,	from	the	perpetrator	of	a	wrong	or	from	others,	consists	in
those	others’	affirmation	with	the	victim	that	the	wrong	is	real	and	its	wrongfulness	is
clear,	that	someone	else	bears	responsibility,	and	that	others	owe	an	accounting	and	may
be	liable	to	sanction	or	for	redress.	At	its	most	effective,	moral	validation	is	a	social
process	in	which	convergent	judgments	about	grave	wrongs	within	a	community	or
society	assure	the	victims	of	wrong	(and	anyone	else	who	may	be	uncertain	or	resistant)
that	norms	are	shared	and	that	the	victims	are	recognized	and	valued	members	of	a
community	prepared	to	respond	to	the	mistreatment	the	victim	has	suffered	with
appropriate	and	justified	demands	for	accountability	on	those	who	have	done	wrong.14
This	is	why	it	is	always	a	standing	obligation	of	communities	to	respond	to	claims	of
serious	wrongdoing	with	respectful	attention	and	to	respond	to	evidence	of	serious
wrongdoing	with	an	affirmation	of	the	standards	violated	and	a	confirmation	that	the
injury	of	the	victim	is	real	and	is	a	matter	for	redress.	Moral	validation	might	not	be
forthcoming	from	wrongdoers	themselves;	indeed,	in	large-scale	violence	offenses	are
typically	minimized,	justified,	and	simply	denied	by	those	with	responsibility.	Nor	do
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victims	always	value	or	respect	an	affirmation	of	standards	from	individual	wrongdoers;
victims	might	find	the	affirmation	of	wrongdoers	incredible	or	irrelevant.	In	any	case
wrongdoers	are	in	a	position	to	affirm	(belatedly)	only	their	own	recognition	of	the
authority	of	violated	moral	standards.	Wrongdoers	are	not	necessarily	in	a	position	to
affirm	either	that	standards	are	authoritative	for	a	community	or	that	the	victim	is	within
the	community’s	protective	concern.	There	is	always	a	communal	responsibility	in	moral
validation	that	alone	can	fully	meet	the	(p.123)	 threat	of	moral	vulnerability.	The
commission	charged	to	study	the	Tulsa	Race	Riot	of	1921	affirmed	the	necessity	of	official
governmental	validation	in	some	cases:	“There	is	no	way	but	by	government	to
represent	the	collective,	and	there	is	no	way	but	by	reparations	to	make	real	the
responsibility”	(Cose	2004,	p.	151).15	The	government	of	Oklahoma,	however,	declined
that	responsibility	on	behalf	of	its	community.
Where	moral	validation	desired	or	sought	by	victims	of	apparently	serious	wrongs	is	not
forthcoming	from	wrongdoers	or	the	relevant	community,	what	does	it	mean?	It	might
mean	that	the	facts	or	seriousness	of	the	violation	are	in	doubt	or	uncertain	in	the	eyes	of
others.	It	might	mean	that	the	moral	standards	that	define	wrongs	in	the	victim’s	eyes	are
questioned	or	rejected	by	others.	It	might	mean	that	the	facts	concerning	responsibility
are	uncertain	(e.g.,	that	the	victim	is,	in	whole	or	in	part,	to	blame)	or	that	standards	of
responsibility	are	unclear	or	contested	in	the	kind	of	case	at	issue.	If	moral	validation	is
not	forthcoming,	at	least	the	judgment	of	the	victim	concerning	wrong	and	responsibility
is	in	question;	the	victim’s	standing	to	enter	claims	to	accountability	may	or	may	not	be
directly	impugned.
Challenges	to	the	victim’s	perception	of	wrong	and	responsibility	in	some	cases,	however,
indicate	a	kind	of	discrediting	or	disqualification	of	the	victim’s	standing	to	make	a
judgment	that	embodies	the	authority	of	group	norms,	and	this	in	turn	can	mean	that	the
victim	is	perceived	as	somehow	not	a	“normal”	or	“representative”	or	“authoritative”
judge	who	embodies	the	community’s	point	of	view.	A	victim’s	attempt	to	enter
accountability	claims	may	also	be	blocked	if	the	victim	is	not	seen	as	protected	by
standards	that	protect	others,	or	at	least	not	at	the	hands	of	the	perpetrator	in	question.
It	may	also	be	that	the	alleged	wrongdoer	is	not	viewed	as	subject	to	the	standards
invoked,	or	at	least	not	in	the	case	of	the	victim	in	question.	In	such	cases,	the	victim	does
not	possess	socially	recognized	authority	to	press	accountability	upon	the	supposed
wrongdoer.	When	those	who	see	themselves	as	seriously	or	grossly	wronged	fail	to
receive	validation,	it	may	not	be	clear	which	of	these	situations	obtains,	but	social
hierarchies	and	de	facto	relations	of	very	unequal	power	or	social	authority	often	result
in	systematic	accountability	differentials	or	asymmetries.
It	is	because	the	victim’s	standing	to	require	accountability	can	be	in	question	that
acknowledgment	of	wrong	and	responsibility	is	crucial	in	constituting	reparations.	It	is	the
clarity	and	adequacy	of	that	acknowledgment	that	resolves	the	question	in	favor	of	the
victim’s	standing	as	a	full	participant	with	others	under	shared	moral	standards	and	one
whose	sound	claims	concerning	(p.124)	 wrong	and	redress	require	respectful
attention.	When	this	acknowledgment	and	responsiveness	is	refused	(or	confused),	the
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potential	for	moral	diminishment,	erasure,	exclusion,	or	abandonment	by	whatever
community	the	victim	appeals	to	for	validation	is	realized.	The	victim	is	morally	vulnerable
to	the	response:	“You	are	in	no	position	to	make	demands	on	us.”	That	is	to	say,	the
victim’s	standing	as	a	participant	in	reciprocal	practices	of	accountability	is	either
unrecognized	or	denied,	at	least	with	respect	to	some	wrongs	the	victim	experiences	as
urgent	and	damaging.	This	refusal	of	accountability	is	common	enough	when	wrongdoers
continue	to	enjoy	social	power	and	prestige.	While	this	might	enrage	victims,	it	is	not	as
consequential	as	a	community’s	failure	or	refusal	to	lend	its	authority	to	victims	seeking
recognition	of	wrongs.
3.	Moral	Vulnerability	and	the	Task	of	Reparations
Once	moral	vulnerability	is	recognized	as	the	underlying	issue	in	redressing	wrongs,	and
once	the	multiple	facets	of	the	standing	to	demand	accountability	are	exposed	more
precise	sense	can	be	made	of	what	is	at	stake	in	redress.	Differences	in	what	reparations
concretely	demand	will	track	the	contours	of	the	kind	and	extent	of	moral	vulnerability
that	is	at	issue	or	the	nature	and	depth	of	the	actual	wound	of	moral	diminishment,
exclusion,	erasure,	or	abandonment	that	individuals	and	groups	have	endured	in
addition	to	their	wrongful	injuries	and	losses.
Reparation	in	all	cases	is	in	some	ways	necessarily	backward	looking:	It	works	on
assessing	and	relieving	the	threat	of	moral	vulnerability	that	inheres	in	the	wrong	already
done	and	the	history	of	the	situation	and	relationships	involved.	In	cases	where	the
victim’s	standing	has	been	questioned	or	denied,	reparations	work	at	closing	and	healing
the	wound	of	erasure,	exclusion,	or	abandonment	that	is	opened	up	by	a	failure	of
validating	responses	to	the	wrong.	Cases	that	call	for	reparation,	however,	vary	greatly	in
the	defining	dimension	of	moral	vulnerability.	If	there	is	no	salient	or	serious	threat	to	the
victim’s	standing	in	an	instance	of	wrongdoing,	a	simple	apology	or	a	straightforward
compensatory	transaction	can	rectify	a	breach	in	conduct	that	does	not	reveal	a	gap	in
accountability	and	the	mutual	recognition	it	signifies.	If	there	is	an	accountability	gap,
however,	the	nature	of	the	gap	matters	and	may	itself	become	the	site	of	other
challenges,	threats,	and	fresh	wounds.	In	disputes	about	fact	or	history,	parties	may	see
each	other	as	merely	mistaken,	or	some	parties	may	arrogate	solely	to	themselves	the
authority	to	define	the	situation.	If	moral	values	or	standards	of	responsibility	are	applied
in	disparate	ways	by	victims	and	those	they	would	hold	to	account,	it	matters	whether
this	is	a	disagreement	among	equals	or	whether	there	is	evidence	that	some	parties
refuse	to	apply	values	and	principles	to	certain	individuals	or	groups.	In	cases	of
historical	injustice,	individuals	or	groups	bring	forward	offenses	(p.125)	 and	damages
previously	denied	or	rationalized	with	reparative	demands	that	encompass	a	history	of
exclusion,	subjection,	violence,	stigma,	or	exploitation	and	in	some	instances	previous
rebuffs	to	earlier	demands.	In	every	case,	reparations	will	have	different	hurdles	to
clear,	and	different	kinds	of	communicative	and	reconstructive	work	will	be	possible	and
necessary	between	the	parties.
Reparations	also	have	forward-looking	aims.	Discussions	of	reparations	that	emphasize
the	element	of	acknowledgment	often	speak	of	the	aim	of	reparations	as	achieving
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respectful	relations,	restoring	trust,	or	establishing	the	victim’s	equality.	Yet	even	if	these
goals—to	establish	respect,	trust,	or	equality—are	the	ultimate	or	regulative	ideals	of
reparative	practice,	more	immediate	questions	about	inclusion	and	recognition	in
mutually	understood	accountability	relations	are	at	stake	in	reparations	struggles.	For
two	reasons,	it	is	unwise	and	implausible	to	burden	reparations	efforts	with	too	much
responsibility	for	good	future	relations.	First,	to	do	so	diverts	attention	from	what	I	am
arguing	is	the	primary	locus	of	actual	reparations	attempts	or	struggles—a	negotiation	of
accountability	in	and	of	the	present	in	light	of	a	sorry	past.	Second,	to	do	so	is	to	conflate
reparations	efforts	and	fulfilling	demands	of	reparative	justice	with	the	achievement	of
substantial	reconciliation.	These	two	issues	are	linked.
First,	when	reparations	are	made,	they	call	the	parties	to	the	reparations	process	to	a
shared	attempt	at	convergent	judgments	of	wrong	and	responsibility	and	to	jointly
meaningful	action	that	responds	both	to	the	wrongful	harms	done	and	to	whatever
threats	of	moral	vulnerability	are	revealed.	The	scene	of	this	attempt	at	renegotiating
accountability	relations	is	the	here	and	now.	An	interesting	fact	about	actual	reparations
movements,	proposals,	and	programs	is	the	degree	to	which	the	problems	and	concerns
to	be	faced	are	often,	perhaps	typically,	only	fully	revealed	in	the	event	of	demands,
rebuffs,	proposals,	debates,	negotiations,	and	agreements.	I	believe	this	is	explained	by
the	fact	that	moral	vulnerabilities	are	multiple,	complicated,	and	not	always	clearly	visible
to	the	parties.	They	are	likely	to	express	themselves	most	clearly	in	the	very	event	in
which	reparations	are	offered	or	sought,	as	this	process	exposes	disjoint	perceptions	of
wrong,	responsibility,	and	obligation.	Even	to	arrive	at	a	determination	of	what	is	wrong
about	what	happened	in	the	past	and	who	is	responsible	for	it	or	its	repair—no	small	feat
in	many	cases—does	not	necessarily	reveal	all	aspects	of	moral	vulnerability	or	the	extent
to	which	its	threat	of	moral	erasure	or	abandonment	has	been	realized.	This	is	a
substantial	part	of	the	work	of	reparations	in	the	present.
Those	who	suffer	moral	vulnerability	as	victims	may	feel	it	acutely.	They	may	be	infuriated
by	the	questions	raised	about	their	understanding	of	the	facts	and	wrongs	of	the	matter
and	outraged	by	the	fact	that	those	to	whom	they	assign	responsibility	often	have	the
power—socially,	institutionally,	and	politically—to	also	appoint	themselves	arbiters	of	the
validity	of	responsibility	(p.126)	 claims.	They	may	be	frustrated	by	the	degree	to	which
their	claims	are	met	with	confident	or	casual	rejection	or	are	deemed	false,	incredible,	or
exaggerated.	Pierre	Hazan	(2010),	writing	of	the	fractious	2001	World	Conference
Against	Racism	in	Durban,	describes	a	European	diplomat	as	saying	that	African	claims	for
compensation	for	colonialism	and	slavery	were	“unreasonable,	bordering	on	psychotic”
(p.	86),	while	Rosa	Amelia	Plumelle-Uribe,	an	Afro-Columbian	writer,	says	of	the
Europeans,	“They	procrastinate	and	assume	a	right	that	defeated	Germany	itself	never
dared	claim,	that	of	defining	their	crimes,	and,	in	place	of	their	victims,	to	decide	what
historic	weight	to	give	or	not	give	to	these	events”	(p.	70).	It	is	true	that	those	seeking
reparations	might	be	mistaken	in	these	feelings	and	the	perceptions	that	ground	them.
But	it	is	also	possible	that	they	might	be	experiencing	precisely	an	asymmetry	in	relations
of	accountability	that	shifts	the	burden	of	proof	and	justification	to	them,	even	as	it	seems
to	tilt	the	balance	of	respect	and	credibility	away	from	them.	Issues	of	moral	vulnerability
Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
Page 15 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Marquette
University; date: 17 September 2014
are	diffuse	and	abstract	relative	to	the	harms	victims	grieve	and	for	which	they	seek
repair;	these	harms	can	include	lost	years	of	wrongful	imprisonment	or	the	deprivation	of
professional	work,	ravages	of	torture,	the	disappearance	of	a	child,	or	the	dispossession
and	decimation	or	the	enslavement	and	subjugation	a	people.	It	is	obvious	in	many	cases
that	what	has	been	lost	can	never	be	returned	or	compensated.	No	one	knows	this
better	than	the	victims.	The	struggle	for	reparations	is	nonetheless	crucial	to	see	whose
claims	will	be	acknowledged	and	whose	responsibility	will	be	established.	Without
understanding	moral	vulnerability,	one	does	not	understand	what	is	at	stake	in
reparations	attempts	and	why	they	proceed	as	they	do.
Often	reparations	(or	reparations	demands)	come	in	waves,	or	in	fits	and	starts,	as	partial
acknowledgment,	rebuffs,	offers,	shifts	in	perspective,	and	historical	and	political
developments	unfold	within	or	around	the	struggle	or	negotiation	for	reparations.	This	is
most	so	in	reparations	for	structural	injustices	or	mass	violence	in	the	national	or
international	political	arena.	Reparations,	I	suggest,	are	really	about	a	present	moment
(although	sometimes	a	protracted	one)	in	which	those	held	responsible	for	reparation	and
those	seeking	it,	and	possibly	others,	argue	over	acceptable	interpretations	of	the	past
they	can	share	and	try	to	negotiate	an	interaction	in	the	present	that	models	fair	terms	of
reciprocal	recognition	and	accountability.	The	moment	that	a	discussion	concerning
reparations	commences	is	a	moment	of	considerable	uncertainty	for	all	parties	to	the
interaction.	Those	who	had	confidently	ignored	or	denied	others’	claims	of	injustice	and
injury	are	responding	newly	both	to	the	claims	and	to	a	new	standing	for	the	claimants.
Those	putting	claims	are	beginning	to	exercise	powers	and	might	experience	leverage
and	opportunity	long	denied	them.	This	means	that	things	are	already	not	what	they
were,	but	are	not	yet	what	they	need	to	become.	One	might	characterize	the	sense	of
relationship	among	the	(p.127)	 parties	as	the	possibility	of	reparations	dawns	and
momentum	for	reparations	builds	as	a	midway	(if	not	a	mid-air)	position,	in	terms	of
accountability.	Reparations	are	about	where	the	parties	can	get	to	in	the	present	in	an
attempt	to	transform	their	relative	positions	in	the	past.	A	reparations	effort	might	best	be
seen	as	a	bridge	from	a	past	not	just	of	unrepaired	harms	but	also	of	accountability
denied	to	a	present	of	reciprocal	accountability	acknowledged.	Seeing	it	this	way	brings
into	focus	the	intricacy	of	the	threats,	wounds,	tentative	steps,	and	difficult	new
understandings	that	are	characteristic	of	the	reparative	process.
This	leads	me	to	the	second	point:	It	is	unrealistic	to	expect	from	reparations	measures
too	much	and	implausible	to	explain	the	function	and	aims	of	discrete	gestures	or
programs	of	reparations	too	largely	in	terms	of	distant	future	relations.	It	is	true,	ideally,
that	the	establishment	of	fair	terms	of	accountability	and	shared	recognition	of	the	moral
standards	they	predicate	should	forecast	better	future	relations.	It	is	certainly	true	that
successful	reparations	are	in	part	successful	if	and	because	they	render	parties	to	the
interaction	hopeful	about	future	relations.	A	measure	of	success	is	whether	the	parties
are	moved	to	try	to	fulfill	the	promise	for	a	possible	future	that	reparations	token.
Successful	reparations	ignite	hope;	hope	involves	energized	attention,	imagination,
alertness	to	possible	routes	to	the	goal,	and	the	resilience	to	keep	looking	for	and	trying
them.16	But	reparations	given	are	best	understood	as	a	marker	of	present	achievement
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in	the	history	of	relations	among	people	or	among	peoples,	an	achievement	measured	by
its	distance	from	the	past	scene	of	wrongdoing.
With	respect	to	the	future,	reparations	can	only	at	best	set	an	example	and	make	a
promise	or	commitment	based	on	what	is	achieved	in	the	present	instance.	The	idea	that
they	actually	achieve	trusting,	respectful,	and	compassionate	relations	asks	too	much,
especially	in	the	aftermath	of	gross	and	massive	violence	or	intergenerational	injustice.
That	they	give	reason	and	create	motivation	to	seek	out	possibilities	for	building	trusting,
respectful,	and	compassionate	relations	is	a	more	fitting	goal.	As	the	wrongs	of	the	past
set	terms	for	reasonable	fear,	disillusionment,	hatred,	or	cynicism,	the	present	at	best
can	give	reasons	for	hope	by	creating	a	sense	of	what	is	possible.	Hope	in	turn	creates
motivation	to	build	the	relations	that	the	reparative	interaction	at	its	finest	exemplifies	and
models.	I	do	not	think	it	wise	to	claim	that	it	builds	those	relations;	it	supplies	a	model	and
ideally	kindles	receptiveness	and	motivation,	for	that	construction	project	over	time	and
under	tests.	This	underscores	the	important	point	that	reparations	do	not	“close	books”
in	many	cases;	they	instead	get	parties	on	the	same	page	concerning	accountability	going
forward.
(p.128)	 4.	Conclusion
I	have	argued	that	we	can	make	sense	of	significant	differences	in	a	large	range	of
reparations	contexts	by	viewing	the	core	issue	of	reparations	as	the	negotiation	by
parties	of	mutually	acceptable	standings	in	accountability	relations	governed	by	shared
norms.	Not	to	enjoy	such	a	standing	is	not	only	to	be	open	to	disregard,	attack,	or	abuse
but	also	to	lack	an	effective	claim	upon	those	responsible	to	give	accounts	and	to	take
responsibility	for	wrongful	harms	one	has	endured.	Yet	it	would	not	be	right,	either,	to
say	that	reparations	are	“not	really	about	the	money.”	Money	or	other	material	transfers
are	often	very	much	at	issue.	It	is	better	to	say	that	sometimes	it	is	crucially	about
material	restitution	or	compensation	but	is	not	so	in	every	case	and	that,	even	where
compensation	is	in	order,	the	reparative	momentum	depends	on	what	the	money	or
goods	mean.	Restitution	or	compensation	is	reparative	when,	in	context	and	accompanied
by	other	gestures,	it	can	sustain	the	necessary	messages	of	acknowledgment	that	affirm
reciprocal	accountability	under	shared	standards.	The	emotional	blight	and	material
losses	of	the	internment	is	not	erased	for	Japanese-Americans	unjustly	interned,	but	they
received	unambiguous	validation	and	multiple	gestures	of	repair	as	citizens	from	their
nation’s	highest	representative	body.	For	the	Lakota	Sioux,	the	settlement	of	a	property
claim	by	a	money	payment	effaces	their	understanding	of	the	nature	and	gravity	of	the
wrong	done	to	them	and	bypasses	the	crucial	issue	of	relations	among	sovereign	entities
upon	which	their	treaty	commitments	with	the	United	States	were	premised.	Those
women	sexually	enslaved	in	Japanese	Army	brothels	who	accepted	payments	from	the
Asian	Women’s	Fund	might	or	might	not	have	found	the	context	and	message	of	the
money	reparative;	some	might	have	found	it	so,	while	others	reasonably	judged	that	they
were	unlikely	to	get	anything	more	or	better.	The	women	who	publicly	rejected	the
payments	made	clear	that	they	continued	to	find	the	Japanese	government	shielding	itself
from	full	accountability	to	them.	Money	alone	does	not	avail	as	reparations.
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With	states,	however,	money	is	clearly	one	powerful	and	objective	medium	in	which
accountability	may	be	pursued	and	demonstrated.	Yet	even	when	it	is,	acknowledgment
of	wrong	and	responsibility,	the	embodiment	of	accountability,	is	often	paramount	as	a
goal	and	a	driving	force	for	victims.	Countries	such	as	Germany,	Argentina,	and	Chile
have	conducted	substantial	monetary	reparations	programs,	but	they	took	shape	in
stages,	enlarging	the	numbers	of	victims	and	the	nature	of	violations	compensated,	in	an
expanding	universe	of	accountability	reshaped	over	time	by	legal	and	political
developments	concerning	accountability	of	states	to	victims	of	human	rights	abuses.17	It
is	not	surprising	that	reparations	demands	entail	and	respond	to	shifts	in	legal	and
(p.129)	 political	status	and	standards	of	accountability,	for	law	and	politics	embody
moral	standing	in	public	and	enforceable	ways.
It	is	also	not	surprising	that	cases	where	money	is	won,	through	litigation	or	negotiation,
are	sometimes	called	reparations	even	if	unambiguous	acknowledgment	of	wrong,
responsibility,	or	an	obligation	of	justice	is	missing.	Victims	who	pursue	legal	redress
might	consider	a	monetary	or	restitution	settlement	a	kind	of	reparations	because	they
believe	that	the	settlement	in	fact	concedes	or	implies	wrong	and	responsibility	publicly
whether	or	not	it	is	admitted.	Victims	or	others	may,	approvingly	or	disapprovingly,	view
monetary	payments	and	other	forms	of	recognition	as	reparations	even	when	they	are
not	so	called	by	those	who	bestow	them.	In	1994,	the	Florida	legislature	awarded
compensation	to	survivors	of	a	white	riot	that	burned	the	African	American	town	of
Rosewood,	Florida,	to	the	ground	in	1923.	The	State	of	Florida	acknowledged	that	it
failed	to	prevent	the	unlawful	destruction	and	provided	compensation	payments,	a
scholarship	fund,	and	other	efforts.	It	did	not	apologize	or	refer	to	its	compensation	as
reparations,	but	it	was	“the	first	time	that	any	American	governmental	body	had
acknowledged	its	responsibility	for	an	act	of	racial	violence	committed	against	African
Americans,	in	the	long	history	of	such	acts”	(Nunn	1999,	p.	435).18	In	historical	context,
against	a	backdrop	of	denial	and	silence	about	many	such	events,	seeing	this	response	as
reparations	claims	a	kind	of	victory.	In	another	case,	the	Japanese	government	refused	to
call	the	payments	it	agreed	to	in	connection	with	its	colonization	of	Korea	reparations	but
agreed	to	let	Korea	inform	its	public	that	Japan	had	paid	reparations,	allowing	the	meaning
of	the	interaction	to	play	differently	for	different	audiences	(Lind	2008,	pp.	47–48).	It	is
true	that	the	potential	for	future	disillusionment	or	betrayal	looms	in	cases	in	which	full
acknowledgment	of	responsibility,	precise	appreciation	of	wrong,	or	acceptance	of	an
obligation	of	reparative	justice	is	lacking,	hedged,	or	ambiguous.	Future	behavior,	or
continuing	or	future	denial	of	wrongdoers	or	responsible	communities,	can	reopen
wounds,	nullifying	hopeful	reparative	interpretations.	But	this	can	also	happen	in	cases
that	fully	meet	the	standard	of	acknowledgment,	responsibility,	and	intent	to	do	justice.
Reparations	can	only	ever	be	an	act	or	process	at	one	time;	the	reciprocal	accountability
they	token	must	be	secured	and	shown	real	over	time.
I	have	argued	that	a	kind	of	moral	vulnerability	inheres	in	accountability	relations.	Victims
of	wrongs	are	vulnerable	to	the	additional	moral	insult	and	injury	of	being	denied	the
standing	of	full	partners	in	reciprocal	relations	of	accountability	by	those	they	would	hold
to	account.	The	potential	for	or	the	(p.130)	 reality	of	additional	insult	and	injury	in	the
Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations
Page 18 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Marquette
University; date: 17 September 2014
aftermath	of	wrongs	provides	a	unifying	view	of	the	task	of	reparations.	Reparations	must
address	not	only	the	harm	and	loss	caused	by	the	original	wrong	but	also	the	nature	and
extent	of	the	moral	vulnerability	exposed	by	the	wrong	or	realized	by	the	absence	of
redress.	The	role	of	moral	vulnerability	in	the	past	and	the	present	explains	why	different
reparations	contexts	require	very	different	responses.
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Notes:
(1)	See	Braithwaite	(2002,	pp.	3–27)	on	the	widespread	use	of	reparative	practices	across
cultures.
(2)	I	will	call	this	kind	of	justice	reparative	justice,	choosing	the	broadest	and	most
intuitive	label	although	even	the	terminology	remains	unsettled.	The	kind	of	justice	that
requires	redress	of	wrongs	and	wrongful	harms	and	losses	is	variously	called	corrective,
commutative,	compensatory,	rectificatory,	reparatory,	reparative,	and	now	also
sometimes	restorative	justice.	These	labels	have	different	connections	and	connotations,
however,	and	there	is	no	universally	shared	view	about	whether	they	refer	to	the	same
concept	of	justice	or	about	what	are	the	paradigmatic	cases	or	defining	characteristics	of
justice	of	that	kind.
(3)	Philosophical	arguments	for	one	or	another	principle	of	individualized	and	ideally
proportionate	compensation	include	Nozick	(1974,	pp.	57–58),	MacCormick	(1977),
Nickel	(1976),	Coleman	(1994),	Wenar	(2006),	and	Winter	(2006).
(4)	The	point	of	this	shift	is	widely	agreed	to	be	the	unprecedented	program	of	massive
reparations	by	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	to	individual	victims	of	the	Holocaust.
On	this	dramatic	historical	shift,	see	Colonomos	and	Armstrong	(2006,	p.	391),	who	call	it
a	“model	of	an	entirely	new	kind	of	reparations.”	See	also	Falk	(2000),	Teitel	(2000,	pp.
119–128),	Torpey	(2003,	pp.	4–5),	and	Barkan	(2003,	pp.	95–98).	On	the	jurisprudence	of
the	Inter-american	Court	of	Human	Rights,	see	Carrillo	(2006).	Falk	stresses	how	large
and	significant	a	shift	in	international	law	is	involved	in	the	developing	concept	of	state
responsibility.	I	do	not	here	defend	state	responsibility	for	reparations,	although	I	believe
it	is	defensible	and	is,	in	any	case,	the	existing	standard.
(5)	The	conditions	and	nature	of	group	claims	are	an	area	in	need	of	much	more
examination.	The	Basic	Principles	in	its	preamble	notes	that	victimization	may	“also	be
directed	against	groups	of	persons	who	are	targeted	collectively”	and,	in	Article	V,	that
“victims	are	persons	who	individually	or	collectively	suffered	harm.”	On	some	ambiguity
in	the	idea	of	collective	reparations,	see	Rubio-Marin	(2009,	especially	pp.	385–387).
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(6)	On	the	interaction	of	legal	claims	and	settlements	and	legislative	actions	in	some
reparations	contexts,	see	Guembe	(2006)	and	Lira	(2006).
(7)	See	de	Greiff	(2006)	on	the	need	for	a	political,	rather	than	legal/juridical,	conception
of	reparations.	See	also	Brooks	(2004),	rejecting	a	tort	model	of	reparations	to	African
Americans;	see	Roht-Arriaza	(2004)	on	the	relevance	of	collective	and	symbolic
reparations	for	communities.	I	contrast	a	juridical	with	a	restorative	justice	framework	in
Walker	(2006b).
(8)	Brooks	(1999)	contains	source	materials	on	Japanese-American	internment	and
redress.	The	case	is	discussed	by	Minow	(1998)	and	Yamamoto	and	Ebesugawa	(2006).
(9)	Much	of	the	tangled	history	is	summarized	in	Iida	(2004).	Some	recent	developments
are	reported	in	Onishi	(2007a,	2007b)	and	Fackler	and	Sang-Hun	(2007).	Lind	(2008)
closely	studies	the	backdrop	of	struggles	with	and	within	Japan	over	responsibility	for
wartime	atrocities,	including	the	enslavement	of	women	in	brothels.	Hamber	and	Palmary
(2009)	offer	a	detailed	consideration	of	the	apologies.	A	Congressional	Research	Service
Memorandum	by	Niksch	(n.d.),	an	Asian	specialist,	is	a	useful	compendium	of	information
up	to	2007.
(10)	For	parallel	distinctions	emphasizing	this	specifically	reparative	dimension	that
transcends	compensation,	see	Roberts	(2002),	Satz	(2007),	Thompson	(2002),	and	von
Platz	and	Reidy	(2006).	Gaus	(2002)	argues	that	compensation	cannot	restore	moral
equality.	Bernstein	(2009)	stresses	that	the	award	of	damages	not	only	serves	to
indemnify	the	victim	for	losses	but	also	allows	the	victim	to	pursue	security	and	freedom
through	recognition	of	the	victim’s	rights;	compensation	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient
for	reparations.
(11)	I	study	in	detail	the	communicative	structure	and	what	I	call	the	expressive	burden
of	reparations	in	Walker	(2013).
(12)	I	introduce	here	the	barest	bones	of	the	practice	of	accountability.	Some	discussions
of	accountability	relations	and	the	effects	of	context	and	power	differences	on	the	ground
are	Harvey	(1999)	and	Walker	(2007).	Smiley	(1992)	offers	a	pragmatic	theory	of
responsibility	that	exposes	the	evaluative	judgments	involved	in	all	responsibility
assessments,	affecting	for	what	and	to	whom	one	is	accountable.	On	a	positional	and
relational	view	of	accountability,	see	Kutz	(2000).
(13)	On	recent	recognition	of	sexual	violence	in	international	law,	see	Askin	(2003),
Duggan	and	Jacobson	(2009),	and	United	Nations	General	Assembly	(1998,	articles	7	and
8).
(14)	My	broader	account	of	victims’	needs	for	voice,	validation,	and	vindication	is	found
in	Walker	(2006a).
(15)	The	community	that	is	relevant	in	affirming	standards	is	context	dependent.	For
human	rights	violations,	the	international	community	may	be	the	relevant	authority.	See
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Addis	(2003)	on	how	the	international	community	is	constituted	in	the	process	of	invoking
international	norms	and	applying	sanctions.
(16)	A	fuller	discussion	of	hope	and	repair	is	found	in	Walker	(2006a,	2010).
(17)	On	German	reparations,	see	Colonomos	and	Armstrong	(2006).	On	Argentina,	see
Guembe	(2006),	and	on	Chile,	see	Lira	(2006).
(18)	See	also	Cose	(2004,	pp.	154–156),	who	contrasts	this	case	with	that	of	the	Tulsa
Race	Riot	of	1921.	Destruction	of	the	African	American	community	of	Greenwood,
Oklahoma,	and	the	massacre	of	between	75	and	300	people	was	documented	by	a	special
commission	in	2001,	but	no	compensation	or	other	measures	of	official	recognition	have
been	forthcoming.
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